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Michael Buckley*
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Abstract
Moral and political philosophers are increasingly using empirical data to inform their normative
theories. This has sparked renewed interest into questions concerning the relationship between
facts and principles. A recent attempt to frame these questions within a broader approach to
normative theory comes from David Miller, who has on several occasions defended ‘contextualism’
as the best approach to justice. Miller argues that the context of distribution itself brings one or
another political principle into play. This paper examines this claim. It considers several plausible
strategies for carrying out Miller’s general project and argues that each strategy fails. Nevertheless,
the author maintains that an investigation into why they fail paves the way for a philosophically
plausible account of the relationship between facts and principles.
Keywords: justice; contextualism; global distributive justice; justification; John Rawls;
David Miller
An enduring problem in moral and political philosophy concerns the relationship
between facts and principles. Every normative theory must, either implicitly or
explicitly, address this relationship, because each theory’s conception of justification,
attribution, and objectivity hinges on an interpretation of it. Assuming, as many
political philosophers do, that principles ‘must be justified by the conditions of life
as we know it or not at all,’1 then the growing body of empirical data collected
from the social and biological sciences might safely be thought to bear on these
interpretations.2 However, determining exactly how empirical data figures into them
remains a philosophical, rather than an empirical, undertaking, for empirical data
can only help inform, but never resolve, this enduring problem.
A recent attempt to frame these issues within a broader approach to normative
theory comes from David Miller, who has on several occasions defended ‘con-
textualism’ as the best way to approach justice.3 Contextualism holds that ‘it is
the context of distribution itself that brings one or other principles into play.’4
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In contrast to ‘universalist’ approaches to justice, which view principles as both
justified independently of their context of application and universally applicable to
all contexts, contextualism treats diverse political issues in terms of their unique
contextual features rather than systematically as part of*and answered in terms
of*an overarching theory of justice.5 It does this by ‘tracing systematic links
between principles of justice and their contexts of application,’ and by exposing
an ‘underlying logic that we can both grasp and use as a critical tool to assess
prevailing conceptions of justice at any particular moment.’6 As a result, contextu-
alism interprets the relationship between facts and principles as interdependent or
mutually supportive.
Miller thinks that contextualism is intuitively appealing insofar as people tend
to think a just or unjust action depends on the circumstances of the situation.7
In addition, it accommodates a plurality of principles, which he again believes is
appealing insofar as it explains the persistence of diverse moral judgments across
various political issues. And finally, contextualism supports the idea that different
principles of justice are rationally justified in virtue of their being tethered, but
not reduced, to facts. Consequently, contextualism comprises a number of related
positions that bear on the relationship between facts and principles: it is a piece-
meal, pluralistic approach that avoids intuitionism, relativism, and reductionism by
defending normative judgments in terms of a link between principles and factual
circumstances.
Miller frames his defense of contextualism in general terms, prompting the
need for further evaluative scrutiny, which he invites. This paper takes up his
invitation. Following Thomas Pogge, it begins by defending the claim that Miller’s
general view is best labeled critical contextualism.8 Critical contextualism traces
systematic links between principles of justice and their contexts of application, as
noted earlier, but makes clear what seems implicit in Miller’s position, namely,
that the delineation of contexts must also be justified. In the absence of further
justification, moral disputes over principles slip too easily into disputes over
competing contextual descriptions. If one person defends a particular response to
global poverty by reference to context A, and another defends a different response
by reference to context B, then it is difficult to see how references to contexts
are anything but normative disputes themselves. Ideally, critical contextualism
can resolve the normative dispute by encompassing a non-normative defense of
the context. As Miller puts it, ‘clashes of principle will not, in general occur, once
the context in which the distributive decision in question is being made is
properly specified.’9 I develop this thought in ‘CONTEXTUALISM AS CRITICAL
CONTEXTUALISM’ section, where I argue that Miller’s contextualism must be
interpreted as critical contextualism if it is to avoid, as Miller puts it, ‘selling the
pass to skepticism, relativism, conventionalism or any other view that discredits
justice as a workable idea for social criticism and social reform.’10
Assuming critical contextualism is an accurate interpretation of Miller’s general
position, it remains unclear how one might realize its several positions within a
single approach, or whether such a realization is even possible. For example, can the
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delineation of a context admit of a clear and uncontroversial description? Is the
account of pluralism sufficiently critical to avoid skepticism, relativism, or con-
ventionalism? Do principles appropriate to one context ever conflict with another,
and, if so, is there a contextual solution to the conflict?
Miller responds to these questions by drawing heavily on empirical research.
I argue in ‘DELIMITING THE CONTEXT: MILLER’S STRATEGY AND
ITS PROBLEMS’ section that this strategy is insufficiently critical, since it is too
accommodating of the status quo and thus incapable of providing a workable idea
for social criticism. I develop an alternative strategy in ‘THREE DISTRIBUTIVE
CONTEXTS’ section, where systematic links between principles and contexts
are presented in terms of a mirroring relationship between a principle’s directive
and the contextual facts that generate claims to resources. The idea is that if one
abstracts from distributive contexts familiar to the philosophical literature on global
justice, one can expose the formal structure underlying a person’s claim to resources.
Assuming these formal structures capture legitimate claims, plausible principles
of justice must share the same formal structure in order to answer the claim.
In ‘JUSTIFICATION IN CONTEXT’ section, I argue that this formal strategy
realizes many of the key features of critical contextualism. However, the strategy offers
no contextual way of balancing conflicts between distributive contexts. Specifically, it
cannot adjudicate situations where the defense of a principle in one context is
conceptually linked to the defense of a principle in another context. Having failed to
develop a contextual answer to what I frame as a priority problem, I argue that the
several plausible strategies for explaining how contextualism might trace systematic
links between principles and factual contexts fail to realize the distinctive features of
contextualism.
These findings raise doubts about whether critical contextualism can realize its
several positions within a distinct approach. However, I do not further conclude from
these doubts that contextualism is without insight. Indeed, an investigation into why
the several strategies fail paves the way for outlining a distinct, philosophically
plausible account of the relationship between facts and principles in normative
theory, which I identify in the conclusion. As a result, one might view this paper as
working within the spirit of Miller’s invitation to scrutinize, examine and develop the
contextual dimensions of normative political theory.
CONTEXTUALISM AS CRITICAL CONTEXTUALISM
A contextual approach to justice reflects a number of related positions. It is pluralistic
insofar as different contexts of distribution support the appropriateness of different
principles; it is objective insofar as judgments based on principles find rational
grounds of justification in a link with factual circumstances; and it is critical insofar
as justified principles serve as independent criteria against which social practices
and institutions are judged and found wanting. To illustrate the key idea, take
the factual circumstances surrounding organ transplants. These circumstances are
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usually sufficiently robust to at least rule out as inappropriate certain distributive
principles. For example, the principle first-come-first-served makes little sense if
the biological match between a kidney and a recipient is crucial to the operation’s
long-term success. In this and other cases, the relevant distribution principle depends
on facts about what is being distributed and to whom it is being distributed.
References to these facts justify the principle.
Miller is not alone in thinking the context important to the justification of
principles. Rawls expresses a similar idea. He notes, ‘it is the distinct structure of
the social framework, and the purpose and role of its various parts and how they
fit together, that explain why there are different principles for different kinds of
subjects.’11 On this view, the distributive context plays a distinct justificatory
role. Different principles are justified in virtue of their appropriate fit to different
subjects or contextual circumstances. Miller describes the ‘fit’ as follows: ‘in context
C it is always right to distribute the relevant goods and bads according to principle
P.’12 Provided we can identify the unique features of context C, we can then
rationally explain and defend the appropriateness of principle P without reference
to a more fundamental or transcendental principle. Given a variety of distinct
contextual situations, it further follows that there is a plurality of equally
fundamental principles that is neither derived from, nor represents the substantive
applications of, an overarching principle of justice.13
One might reasonably resist the claim that contextualism is rationally grounded
and thus sufficiently critical by citing the work of Michael Walzer. Walzer’s manner
of identifying distributive spheres, or contexts, captures a factual component
(the ‘factual’ social meaning of a particular good) and matches these factual
elements to normative directives (the principles that inform the good’s distribution).
On Walzer’s view, the ‘crucial medium of social relations’ is a shared conception
of ‘what the goods are and what they are for.’14 It is this shared social meaning
that determines the distribution of a particular good. Moreover, ‘[m]en and women
take on concrete identities because of the way they conceive and create, and then
possess and employ social goods.’15 As a result, both distributive principles and
judgments about them are based on ‘people’s deepest sense of how they ought to
live,’ or how ‘we mean to live and don’t yet live.’16 Since these meanings are rooted
in culture, distributive principles*along with the operative conceptions of moral
persons*are culturally relative.
While Walzer’s line of reasoning could generate agreement on the ‘facts’ (in an
anthropological sort of way), his contextualism fails to be critical in the following
sense: principles fail to serve as independent criteria against which social practices
can be assessed and found wanting. This is because the defense of principles is
based on the very social values (and practices) the principles are meant to assess.
Walzer readily concedes the point. He views the social critic as an interpreter of
a society’s history and culture*one who assesses the ‘fit’ between a society’s
institutions and ideals. Those best positioned to interpret this ‘fit’ are those raised in
the society.17 Outside criticism is generally illegitimate, because knowledge about the
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social fabric of society*essential to the interpretation*is generally unavailable to
foreigners.18
Walzer’s ‘contextualism’ illustrates the following point. To avoid relativism or
conventionalism, principles must be sufficiently independent of cultural bias so as to
serve as independent criteria against which prevailing norms and the policies they
support can be assessed. It is not enough to trace ‘systematic links between principles
of justice and their contexts of application.’ A critical contextualism must trace
systematic links between principles and contexts that are themselves justified.
It is not always clear whether Miller views his conception of ‘social criticism’
as being significantly different from Walzer’s, because he sometimes cites Walzer’s
view as an illustration of contextualism.19 However, if contextualism is to avoid, as
Miller puts it, ‘selling the pass to skepticism, relativism, conventionalism or any
other view that discredits justice as a workable idea for social criticism and social
reform,’ then Walzer serves as a poor model.20 We must instead follow Pogge, who
suggests anchoring the delimitation of the context in a more objective defense.21
Supposing we can objectivley defend the delimitation, then the principles appro-
priate to the context are likewise firmly anchored, and thus able to serve as
independent metrics of assessment.
Tracing systematic links between principles and contexts that are themselves
justified suggests the following. In addition to justifying a principle as appropriate
to some context, the delineation of the context requires a self-standing justification.
In the absence of a self-standing justification, moral debates over principles slip too
easily into debates over competing contexts.
How might the context be justified? As I have just described it, contextualism
seems to imply a division of labor between the justification of a context and the
justification of a normative principle appropriate to the context. This suggests
achieving the former defense prior to the latter, which in turn suggests the arrows
of justification point in one direction, from the facts comprising the context to the
principle of distribution. In some cases, the contextual facts might imply aims that
in turn move justification smoothly from facts to principles, as perhaps in the case
of organ transplants. However, there are two problems with this approach. First,
the arrangement of facts comprising a context might be complex and open to
competing interpretations.22 Consider the question: why have some societies become
rich while others have remained poor? Historical studies and development economics
offer competing answers.23 For example, while there are good reasons to think
domestic institutions*such as dependable property rights, law, bureaucratic
capacity, and independent courts*are causally efficacious for economic growth, it
is unclear whether these factors are sufficiently insulated from global structures to
be independently efficacious. In the absence of a resolution among rival explanatory
theories, the context cannot be described clearly and uncontroversially.
One might object to this by noting that while no dominant explanatory model
currently exists, further empirical work could yield one. As with other areas of
empirical investigation, the supporting data can mount in favor of one theory over
another, at which point the context of distribution would be justified on familiar
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empirical grounds. But this leads to a second, more troubling philosophical
difficulty; namely, that the very purpose of identifying certain facts in support of
a normative principle is already guided by a practical enterprise influenced by a
variety of social factors. Here the problem is not that of reconciling competing
empirical accounts through further empirical research. Rather, the problem is
establishing a clear and uncontroversial description of the context. This problem
might result because people assign different weights to the facts agreed on. Since
the assignment of weights is not itself determined by the facts (for if it were,
then those further facts would be subject to competing assignments as well,
suggesting an infinite regress), the different descriptions are incommensurable.24
Or the problem might result from a variety of more complicated reasons advanced
by philosophers as diverse as Nietzsche, Gadamer, Quine, Davidson, and Rorty.
These philosophers have problematized the conceptions of rationality and reality
on which clear and uncontroversial descriptions of facts are normally based.
In the process, they challenge the very possibility of developing a self-standing
justification of a particular context based on empirical data. In the absence of an
uncontroversial description, little justificatory force is gained by referencing contexts,
because disputes over principles simply slip to disputes over contextual interpreta-
tions. This undermines Miller’s claim that ‘clashes of principle will not, in general
occur, once the context in which the distributive decision in question is being made is
properly specified.’25
How might one respond to these notable and troubling philosophical challenges?
There are at least three possibilities. First, one might concede their points by
couching interpretations of contexts in terms of reflective equilibrium.26 Second, one
might concede their points by specifying interpretations of contexts in terms of
political problems in need of rectification.27 Third, one might jettison the idea of a
self-standing justification by construing the relationship between principles and
context as mutually supportive. Miller opts for the third strategy, which is sometimes
specified as a modified version of the first.28 He claims that distributive principles
both reflect and help constitute contextual circumstances.29 In the next section,
I explore this idea and argue that Miller’s execution of it is insufficiently critical.
DELIMITING THE CONTEXT: MILLER’S STRATEGY AND ITS
PROBLEMS
Identifying an ‘interdependent’ relationship between principles and contexts is an
exercise in justification*we are looking for principles appropriate to a context.
Miller conceives political justification in terms of a link between the epistemic and
practical dimensions of political philosophy. ‘A condition for a theory’s being
valid,’ Miller writes, ‘is that it should be possible for people to come to accept it
and live according to its principles.’30 Principles cannot make impossible demands
on us and still be publicly justifiable; nor can they demand a social order too far
from our institutional capacities to be practicably feasible.31 Public justification and
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practical feasibility place limits on the appropriateness of principles, and these two
limits predominately characterize Miller’s approach to justification.
When fixing on these limits, Miller is acutely aware of the philosophical problems
they create. For example, when identifying co-citizenship as a factual limit on
the feasibility of global justice, Miller notes that this seems to ‘take for granted
an institutional arrangement that might itself be regarded as unjust: the existence
of separate states each delivering a separate bundle of rights, opportunities, and
resources to its own members, but not to outsiders.’32 Miller seems to imagine a
hypothetical critic arguing that co-citizenship, while indeed a fact, represents a
historically contingent fact in need of justification, and it is a mistake to treat
this contingent fact as a limiting condition on a principle’s justification. To do so,
the critic might continue, is to turn the critical relationship between principles
and institutions on its head. Rather than principles serving as independent criteria
against which institutions are assessed and found wanting, the institutions serve
as fixed points against which principles are judged feasible. This undermines their
critical function by privileging the status quo and placing it beyond reproach.
Miller recognizes the problem, but rather than abandon reference to facts, he
recasts the challenge as one about determining which facts count as contextual
limits our theory must recognize as fixed, and which count as contingencies our
theory’s principles might alter.33 Assuming, as many political philosophers do, that
principles ‘must be justified by the conditions of life as we know it or not at all,’
the challenge might be framed as follows.34 When defending a set of principles,
one must avoid confusing cultural or historical contingencies with fixed limits, or else
one unwittingly affirms the status quo. But one must also avoid confusing the
fixed limits with contingent facts, or else one unwittingly creates a useless, utopian
theory. Rawls identifies the same problem. For Rawls, there is a ‘question about
how the limits of the practicably possible are discerned and what the conditions
of our social world in fact are.’35 The problem is that ‘the limits of the possible
are not given by the actual, for we can to a greater or lesser extent change political
and social institutions and much else.’36
Like Miller, Rawls relates this problem to the practical roles of political philosophy.
One such role is to orientate the public toward a possible way of viewing its political
and social relations; the other is to reconcile the public with certain facts about
human relations discovered over time.37 Pursuing these aims simultaneously implies
constructing the most just theory possible. While feasibility places a constraint on
justification, practical expedience must not be purchased at the price of leaving
a more just, albeit less expedient, alternative on the table.38 As Rawls puts it,
normative theory should identify a realistic utopia.
The question is whether Miller sufficiently meets this challenge. As characterized
earlier, the ‘limits of the practicably possible’ imply a theory can err either by failing
to reach the outer edge of the limit or by transgressing it. These two possibilities
obtain because (1) facts serve as a ceiling beyond which our moral ideals become
sheer fancy and (2) principles serve as a floor below which our practical observations
expose mere expedience. The relationship between facts and principles portrayed by
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this challenge can be characterized as mutually supportive; facts and principles
check each other. The challenge is to explain this relationship in a manner that
preserves both the critical function of principles and the feasibility constraint of
facts. Miller, I argue, employs a strategy that fails to preserve the critical function
of principles.
To see this, consider Miller’s public justifiability constraint. A publicly justified
theory of justice is one that ‘appears no longer as an external imposition conjured
up by the philosopher, but as a clearer and more systematic statement of the
principles that people already hold.’39 In other words, a theory’s principles should
not transgress the factual limits of the practicably possible. This is important
because political philosophy, as a branch of practical reasons, aims to inform and
govern the judgments of citizens in their support and deliberation of institutional
structures and social practices.40 A set of political principles cannot effectively serve
this aim if it places foreign or idealistic obligations on those it is meant to govern.
Miller, in an effort to guard against this error, looks ‘empirically at the judgments
and behavior of people when they allocate resources in different contexts.’41 In the
absence of empirical testing, Miller worries that the moral ideals embodied in a
political theory risk becoming utopian in the pejorative sense of the word. A utopian
theory is an invalid theory, since, as already noted, a condition for a theory’s being
valid is that it should be possible for people to accept it.
However, why should we suppose, as Miller’s argument would have us suppose,
that the empirical data relied on, which describes actual beliefs, set the limit for
what people might possibly accept? Obviously, the beliefs and behaviors of
Southern Americans prior to 1865 set public justifiability constraints on the abolition
of slavery. It certainly was impossible for them to willingly accept emancipation.
But to infer from this the invalidity of a slave-free society, and to further suggest
the impossibility of accepting such a society at some point in the future, is to
confuse historically contingent facts with contextual limits our theory must recognize
as fixed.
Empirical data concerning actual beliefs cannot inform us as to the status of
those beliefs. Here Rawls is instructive. For Rawls, correct normative judgments
and the ‘facts’ to which they refer depend on our having first taken up some
normative standpoint.42 To illustrate this, Rawls notes that slavery is unjust because
it allows some to own others. It is this fact and not the fact that slavery occurred
in some places or at certain times that makes slavery wrong. The first fact reflects
the ‘so-called right-and-wrong-making characteristics,’ which we can identify
because ‘a constructivist procedure is framed to yield the principles and criteria
that specify which facts about actions, institutions, persons, and the social world
generally, are relevant in political deliberation.’43 In the absence of a way of discer-
ning contingent from non-contingent facts, a theory risks privileging the status quo
at the price of a more just alternative.
A political theory developing an interdependent relationship between principles
and facts must balance empirical data with a method for morally assessing the
data’s relevance. To some extent, Miller’s reliance on a second type of factual
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consideration, ‘presuppositional’ evidence, is meant to achieve this balance, because
it aims to draw analytical distinctions between social values that can then be used
to interpret empirical findings. The general idea is that unless certain facts are
presupposed to hold true for certain kinds of associations, the normative concepts
ordinarily used to assess those associations become irrelevant or unfeasible.44
For example, it is sometimes argued that our ordinary concept of social justice
requires, as a presuppositional condition, something like Hume’s circumstances of
justice.45 Likewise, Miller develops several ‘modes of association’ that explain certain
distributive concepts commonly applied in contemporary liberal society. These
include solidaristic associations such as the family, instrumental associations such
as the corporation, and political associations such as the state. Each association
has a corresponding distribution principle that ‘not only reflects the character of
group relations but also helps to constitute those relations for the future.’46 For
example, ‘need’ identifies the proper principle for solidaristic associations, ‘desert’
captures the appropriate principle for instrumental relations, and, within political
associations, ‘equality’ determines just distributions. In the absence of presupposi-
tional conditions, such as ‘common identity’ within solidaristic associations, certain
distributive principles such as ‘need’ cannot hold. As a result, presuppositional facts
place feasibility constraints on appropriate principles, but those principles also help
isolated certain facts as relevant to normative assessment. Thus, there is a mutually
supportive relationship between the moral concept and a fact.
While this approach risks reintroducing the sort of conventionalism associated
with Walzer,47 I think an alternative way of carrying it out provides a promising
strategy for establishing an interdependent relationship between principles and
contexts, and I suggest such an alternative in the next section. Presenting a plausible
version, however, faces significant challenges not only illustrated by the aforemen-
tioned risk of conventionalism but also by Miller’s characterization of the global
justice mode of association. He describes this relation as one among nations
forming independent political communities with interests in determining the future
of their own community, rather than ‘among people who are citizens of the same
political community.’48 The presuppositional fact implicit in this mode, namely,
the relations among self-determining political units, places a feasibility constraint on
appropriate principles of global justice. But from where does this constraint arise?
Miller again relies on empirical research, noting that philosophers working on
global justice can ‘elaborate principles that are consistent with what can be regarded
as common ground’ among social scientists working in the area.49 The ‘common
ground’ includes the observation that ‘‘‘domestic factors’’ . . . play at least a signifi-
cant part in explaining the relative wealth and poverty of nations, and that this is
enough to ground an investigation of national responsibility.’50 Apparently, the
question is ‘not what institutions we ought to have, but what the institutions we
currently have would have to do to be justified.’51
This is a perfectly legitimate question, but even a plausible response to it does
not answer the challenge Miller sets himself. Recall, the challenge is to discern
which facts count as contextual limits our theory must recognize as fixed and
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which count as contingencies our theory’s principles might alter.52 Social science
concerning existing associations cannot answer this question, since existing associa-
tion do not exhaust the set of feasible associations. In order to know whether a theory
has reached the feasible limits, we must distinguish between historically contingent
institutions our theory’s principles might alter and non-contingent institutions our
theory must recognize as fixed. In the absence of this distinction, we risk purchasing
a feasible theory at the price of a more just, albeit less expedient, alternative.
Miller’s reliance on empirical data has been criticized for a variety of reasons in
other places.53 I have focused my argument around Miller’s own standard of
criticism, arguing that Miller’s reliance on empirical data does not avoid, as he
puts it, ‘selling the pass to skepticism, relativism, conventionalism or any other view
that discredits justice as a workable idea for social criticism and social reform.’54
It does not provide a workable idea of social criticism because its manner of testing
normative principles is not balanced against a mechanism for testing the status of
facts. Expressed in terms of the ‘limits of the practicably possible,’ it does not identify
both the facts serving as a ceiling beyond which our moral ideals become sheer
fancy and the principles serving as the floor below which our practical observations
expose mere expedience. Rather, it risks purchasing feasibility and public acceptance
at the price of expedience.
The analysis of Miller’s strategy, however, exposes contextualism to a more
general difficulty, for if the identification of non-contingent factual limits first
requires normative principles, then it cannot also be true that the justification of
normative principles first requires the identification of non-contingent factual
limits. Nor can one begin with a normative standpoint in order to inform the
selection of contextual facts, because one would then require a non-normative
justification of this standpoint.55 If each route assumes having first traversed the
other, then how can a critical contextualism realize the otherwise appealing idea that
principles are justified by virtue of a mutually supportive fit within different contexts?
I noted previously that Miller’s ‘modes of association’ suggest a promising
approach. Rather than provide a self-standing justification of contexts, or defend
the connection between principles and modes of association on empirical grounds,
or begin with moral concepts in order to isolate relevant facts, we might instead
abstract from modes of distribution widely identified in the philosophical literature
in order to analyze their formal structures. If the formal structures expose the
manner in which certain claims to resources originate, then those structures include
within them some minimal normative content*a person’s claim to resources.
Principles answering these claims can be said to ‘fit’ the mode of association and
determine how resources should be distributed. This formal approach can then
explain the ‘fit’ in terms of an underlying logical relationship between a principle’s
directive and the origins of a claim. It is this underlying logic rather than the moral
concepts or empirical data that generates the critical leverage for assessing existing
institutions and practices. I now turn to this alternative strategy to see whether it can




In this section I examine the formal structures of three distributive contexts common
to the global justice literature. The aim is to explain the idea of ‘an underlying
logic [between principles and contexts] that we can both grasp and use as a critical
tool when assessing the prevailing conceptions of justice.’56 The three contexts
are not meant to be exhaustive. Rather, they are meant to illustrate an alternative
way of explaining the interdependent relationship between principles and contexts.
To avoid confusion, I note at the outset that I am not trying to defend these
three contexts. Rather, I assume them in order to better explain what is meant by
the ‘fit’ between principles and contexts, and how an ‘underlying logic’ might be
used to generate the critical leverage expected of principles. This assumption should
work in favor of critical contextualism. However, as I explain in the next section, this
strategy also fails to realize all the distinct elements of critical contextualism.
Two of the three contexts are prevalent in the philosophical literature, including
the global justice literature. Following Rawls, I will refer to one as an allocative
association and the other as a pure procedural association.57 Allocative and pure
procedural associations capture distinct relations between the goods delivered, the
parties receiving or providing goods, and the manner in which claims to goods
originate. I will argue that these contexts inform the structure of the normative
directives meant to govern the associations, because principles responding to these
distinct relations must be structured in particular ways if they are to properly
respond, or reflect, the circumstances they are meant to govern.
Consider an allocative association, which involves the allocation of existing
goods among non-cooperative agents, or agents having nothing to do with creating
the goods distributed. The discernable features of an allocative context include:
(1) the agents [states, individuals] whose needs, desires, capacities, and preferences
are known, and between whom allotments of bundles of goods take place, (2) the
fact that those receiving allotments have not produced the goods delivered, and
(3) the absence of a shared institutional arrangement between donors and recipients.
As a result, the recipients’ claims are not based on their productive efforts or on
reasons citing shared institutional arrangements. Instead, claims are based on the
recipients’ particular characteristics, such as their need for certain resources.
Similarly, donors are identified by some characteristic, such as capacity, in virtue
of which transfers might be deemed morally obligatory.
Given the discernable features of an allocative association, normative directives
governing it must identify both the characteristics of recipients by which entitlements
are determined and the characteristics of donor parties by which remedial responsi-
bilities are assigned.58 For example, the principle to each according to need, from each
according to ability reflects an allocative context insofar as it directs the transfer of
some already made good from one group to another based on specific characteristics
of each group. Rawls’s ‘duty of assistance’ provides another example. For Rawls,
the duty to assist obligates well-ordered societies to assist those states that could be
‘well-ordered’ save for their want of human, material, technological, or institutional
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capital.59 The underlying logical structure of an allocative principle is captured by the
following decision-making rules:
Resource Entitlement Rule (RER)
. Allocate resource m to agent a whenever a meets criterion x.
Remedial Transfer Rule (RTR)
. If agent b meets criterion y, allocate resource m from b to a whenever a meets the
previous RER condition.
Here x and y represent substantive criteria by which allocations are deemed just.
Using Rawls’s duty of assistance as an example of a substantive principle, we can
fill in the variables as follows: If society b is well-ordered (y), then allocate resource
m to society a if society a’s needs results only from a want of human, material,
technological, or institutional capital (x).
Rawls’s duty of assistance has been criticized for failing to address the effects
of an increasingly complex global marketplace.60 According to this criticism, a
relevant contextual feature of global distributive justice is a global economic order
comparable in extent and in distributional effects to the domestic economic order.
As such, the moral dimensions of global poverty must be analyzed under the light
of a global economic basic structure.
Those taking this perspective frame global distributive justice in terms of a pure
procedural context. A pure procedural context involves the distribution of goods
created by and distributed among cooperative agents. Its salient features include an
institutional order within which production and subsequent distribution takes
place. The principles appropriate to this context set background economic rules,
and are thus ‘prior to both production and distribution and therefore involve
neither the idea of an already existing pool of stuff to be doled out nor the idea of
already owned resources to be redistributed.’61
Within a pure procedural association, a person’s claim to a resource derives
from one’s having played by the rules governing the institutional order. Distributions
are determined not by an allocative principle redistributing already produced
goods from one party to another on the basis of their specific characteristics, but
rather by a pure procedural principle governing the background economic structure.
As in the case of a lottery, whereby each person is given an equal chance to receive
a good, the outcome*whatever it might be*is appropriate in light of the rules
and purposes of the distributive process.
In a pure procedural association, claims to resources originate with one’s
cooperative effort in creating the goods under a shared set of institutional arrange-
ments. A key function of a pure procedural principle is to define appropriate
distributions in terms of legitimate expectations. Capitalistic economies governed by
private property rules illustrate the point: distributions result from various decisions
made within a marketplace and no attempt is made to redistribute already produced
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resources on the basis of specific characteristics of particular individuals.62 Instead,
supply and demand determines distributions through a price-coordinated system
of exchange affected by the innumerable decisions of consumers and producers.
We can express the underlying logic of pure procedural principles more formally
by noting the following decision-making rules:
Public Structure Rule (PSR)
. If structure z is a unified structure of cooperation, then z is to be ordered by a set of
public rules against which claims to resources can be made and judged legitimate.
Legitimate Expectations Rule (LER)
. If a acts in accordance with the public rules identified by PSR, then a is entitled
to whatever distribution follows from acting in accordance with those rules.
Notice that a pure procedural association is logically distinct from an allocative one.
Whereas the latter identifies appropriate holdings on the basis of certain character-
istics of particular individuals, the former identifies an appropriate set of public
rules against which legitimate expectations are formed and holdings deemed just.
A logically sound defense of a distributive principle depends on its fit with a
distributive association. For those citing domestic factors as the cause of global
poverty, the problem of global distributive justice (if there is such a problem) is to
identify the relevant characteristics by which recipients are entitled and donors
obligated to transfer existing goods. Pure procedural principles of distributive justice,
such as Rawls’s difference principle, are conceptually inappropriate to this context,
since the manner in which they adjudicate conflicting claims depends on a unified
structure of cooperation within which production and subsequent distribution takes
place. In the absence of a unified structure of cooperation, pure procedural principles
cannot perform their key function, namely, to order the public rules governing
unified schemes and determining the legitimacy of claims. Conversely, those citing
global economic institutions as the cause of poverty must find allocative principles
logically inappropriate, because they merely redirect the holdings of preexisting
goods. However, the problem does not rest on the redistribution of preexisting
goods*the problem rests on the inappropriate rules governing the global institutions
within which production takes place.
While allocative and pure procedural contexts frame many philosophical argu-
ments on global distributive justice, a third context is appropriate in some cases. I call
this third context a transitive context, since it reflects claims arising from externalized
burdens, that is, harms created by one group but experienced by another group
having nothing to do with creating the harms. The question of a transitive context
is this: to what extent must some individuals or states honor the claims of others
with whom they share a common structure but no cooperative relation? A transitive
relation is distinct from a pure procedural one, since the latter focuses on the
cooperative efforts within a unified structure of institutions and identifies legitimate
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expectations in light of public rules. However, those rules say nothing about
the effects of cooperative decisions on other parties through a shared but non-
cooperative structure, such as a shared ecosystem. These shared structures provide
conduits through which benefits created by one group pass over and take effect
as burdens for another group having nothing to do with creating those burdens.63
As a decision made within a cooperative association might create a costly and
coercive imposition on another non-cooperating party, the latter party may have
legitimate claims against the first.
A key function of transitive principles is to identify the particular characteristics
by which transferred burdens are assessed. Another key function is to identify the
links through which remedial responsibilities are assigned. Given these functions,
the normative directive must specify a point at which an externalized burden is
deemed illegitimate. We can express its logical structure with the following decision-
making rules:
The Externality Rule (ER)
. If non-cooperative structure z can facilitate the externalization of burden x from
a to b, then z must be constrained by criterion y, which identifies a point
below which the externality is illegitimate.
Remedial Transitive Rule (RTR)
. If burden x is created by a and realized in b through (ER) such that the burden
causes b to fall below y, then b is entitled to resources reestablishing level y.
While a transitive context has a unique structure, it shares features with both pure
procedural and allocative contexts. Like pure procedural contexts, it ties resource
claims to shared structures that help determine and shape distributions. Like
allocative contexts, it identifies a criterion for assessing resource holdings on the basis
of specific information about particular agents. The similarities can sometimes
lead to confusion over whether a distributive principle fits one or another context,
but one way to contrast the three distributive contexts is to ask the following.
(1) Are the distributed resources created through the cooperative efforts of those
receiving the distribution? (2) Do parties share a structure that helps determine the
distributions? (3) Is some evaluative criterion required to assess people’s individual
resource holdings? Allocative contexts answer ‘no’ to the first two questions and
‘yes’ to the last. Pure procedural contexts answer ‘yes’ to the first two questions
and ‘no’ to the last, and transitive contexts answer ‘no’ to the first and ‘yes’ to the
last two questions.
JUSTIFICATION IN CONTEXT
The distributive contexts identified previously are formal in that they identify how
the structure of an association determines the manner in which claims to resources
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originate. The structure in turn informs the key functions of a principle responding
to these claims. In order for the principle to answer a claim, its structure must
reflect the form of association within which the claim originates. It is in virtue of
this reflection that principles are said to ‘fit’ their contexts of application, and it is
in the analysis of the context that this ‘fit’ can be said to express an underlying
logic*for once the association is analyzed as an allocative, pure procedural, or
transitive association, then the normative theorist will know instantly what kind
of formal principle is required to answer the claim.
Moreover, the formal strategy informs the relevance of empirical data. That is,
empirical data are relevant when it fills out the details of the formal association. We
are to look for data determining which association is appropriate to the moral
analysis of political issues, such as, poverty, public health, resource conflict, and
human migration. In some cases, the data might not sufficiently determine the
appropriateness of one association. In other cases, the data might mount in favor of
one association over another. Nevertheless, the formal strategy provides a perspective
from which to interpret and clarify the relevance of empirical data to moral analysis.
To give these abstract considerations some content, consider the effects of global
warming on the Himalayan glaciers and Tibetan plateau. These glaciers are among
the world’s largest freshwater catchments and the source of fresh water for over
1 billion people.64 Stable glaciers act as seasonal water towers, locking fresh water in
the winter and releasing it gradually throughout the warming months. According
to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), ‘changes in snow
and glacier melt, as well as rising snowlines in the Himalayas, will affect seasonal
variation in runoff, causing water shortages during the dry summer months. One-
quarter of China’s population and hundreds of millions in India will be affected.’65
In order to correct for the quickening pace of glacier melt and compensate for
increasingly drier summer months, China, India, and other countries must invest
in new water storage facilities now. In the absence of investment today, people
will suffer terribly tomorrow.
How should the normative dimensions of this issue be framed, and what principle
should govern a response? If variations in the earth’s surface temperature are
naturally caused, then claims to resources cannot originate from either cooperative
efforts or coercive impositions among groups. Supposing this is the case, then
questions of justice cannot be framed in terms of pure procedural or transitive
contexts. They must instead be framed in terms of an allocative context (if they are to
be framed at all), since the normative principle appropriate to this analysis must
identify: (1) the particular characteristics by which people are entitled to resources
and (2) the particular characteristics by which donors are assigned remedial
responsibilities. If the principle does not identify these features, it cannot answer
the claim in a manner fitting its origin. And if it cannot answer the claim in a manner
fitting its origin, the solution offered will appear inappropriate, arbitrary, and
unjustified. By contrast, an appropriate principle might direct wealthy countries to
aid poorer countries facing serious fresh water shortages, as Rawls’s duty of assis-
tance suggests; or it might direct today’s residents of the affected areas to allocate
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savings toward investments for the sake of tomorrow’s potentially water-starved
residents. In each case, existing resources are allocated from one group to another
based on specific characteristics of the groups.
Now suppose that global warming is anthropogenic, as the IPCC argues.66
Claims to fresh water resources will have originated from a shared structure through
which coercive impositions are facilitated between groups. One might argue that
because the cooperative efforts of one (or several) party have generated pollutants
passing over and taking effect as burdens in another party having (at least until
recently) nothing to do with creating the burden, the first party is obligated to offset
the burden. In this case, the principle must reflect a transitive context; its directive
must identify (1) the appropriate characteristics by which transferred burdens are
deemed illegitimate and (2) a link through which remedial responsibilities are
assigned. Appropriate holdings might be framed in terms of an adequate network
of water storage towers, and remedial responsibilities might be assigned to those
burning fossil fuels, perhaps through a global carbon tax on fossil fuel consumption.
These two competing analyses depend for their resolution on empirical data. But,
given the formal strategy, we now possess a perspective shaping the fact patterns
drawn from raw data. Once the data mounts in favor of one pattern, the association
it favors will determine the form of the principle governing obligations and
entitlements. This illustrates how a distributive principle’s directive ‘fits’ the context
of application. It also illustrates how one might trace ‘systematic links between
principles of justice and their contexts of application’ by exposing an ‘underlying
logic that we can both grasp and use as a critical tool when assessing the prevailing
conceptions of justice.’67 The underlying logic is captured by the mirroring
relationship between the principle’s directive and the facts filling out the structure
of the association. In other words, once a context is analyzed as allocative, for
example, then its governing principle must*as a matter of logical structure*allocate
existing goods between parties based on the characteristics of the parties. Expressed
the other way around, the rules reflected in allocative, pure procedural, and transitive
principles require certain things to be true of their contexts of application if each
is to function properly. In the case of allocative principles, goods must already exist,
and donors and recipients must exhibit clear characteristics. By contrast, pure
procedural principles function in a context where what matters is neither the
existence of already produced goods nor the specific characteristics of persons,
but rather a unified scheme of cooperation within which production and subsequent
distribution takes place. And finally, transitive principles require for their proper
functioning a context characterized by externalized harms. In the absence of these
factual features, a distributive principle cannot function properly, it cannot answer
claims people make. If it cannot function properly, it cannot be justified as
appropriate to the context.
The formal strategy also explains Miller’s claim that ‘clashes of principle will
not, in general occur, once the context in which the distributive decision in question
is being made is properly specified.’68 Once the analysis of the context identifies
it to be allocative, for example, the distributive principle must take an allocative
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form. It cannot take the form of either a pure procedural or transitive principle.
As a result, the formal strategy provides the critical leverage expected of critical
contextualism, because the underlying logic exposed by the analysis determines
which formal principle is appropriate. If one applies a pure procedural principle to an
allocative context, then the error can be explained and rationally corrected.
One notable drawback to this strategy is that it is unable to resolve clashes between
substantive principles sharing the same form. This is because the strategy only
exposes the formal relationship between principles and contexts. It does not further
discriminate among substantive principles and, as a result, produces a rather weak
account of justification. Normative political judgments are justified when they are
based on principles whose form fits the context of application. The form can be
expressed by more than one substantive principle. For example, the substantive
principles to each according to need, from each according to ability and Rawls’s duty
of assistance are each allocative. The formal strategy offers no way to determine
which of the competing principles better serves the claims resulting from allocative
associations. As a result, it cannot determine which of the two is uniquely
appropriate to a context. In the absence of further determination, the formal
strategy’s critical leverage is limited.
While this is a serious shortcoming, I do not find it fatal. On the contrary, it
helps explain the open texture of moral debate, and provides a rationale for why
rival substantive principles might gain wide consensus among opposing parties.
At the same time, it significantly narrows the field of plausible rivals by eliminating
as unfit those principles failing to reflect the manner in which claims to resources
originate. So while the formal strategy cannot reconcile competing substantive
principles sharing the same form, its inability to do so actually explains a persistent
feature of moral discourse.
A much more serious problem with this strategy is that it offers no contextual
way of balancing conflicts between distributive contexts. Specifically, it is unable
to resolve situations where the defense of a principle in one context is conceptually
linked to the principle of another context. Such conflicts seem likely to occur
between pure procedural and transitive principles, because the legitimate expecta-
tions established by pure procedural principles depend in part on whether the unified
structure of cooperation they support create illegitimate externalities. Rawls provides
an instructive case when discussing the relation between the difference principle
and the just saving principle.69 The difference principle is a pure procedural
principle. It governs legitimate expectations by specifying the public rules against
which claims among cooperative members are made and judged legitimate. The just
savings principle is a transitive principle. It identifies a criterion against which the
present generation can assess its rate of accumulation so that future generations do
not fall below a just level of wealth. ‘The just savings principle acts as a constraint
on the rate of accumulation;’ the difference principle arranges economic inequalities
so that they are ‘to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with
the just savings principle.’70 As a result, the defense of the difference principle is
conceptually linked to the just savings principles. Future generations’ claim to a
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minimum level of wealth takes priority over the present generation’s claim to wealth
(beyond that minimum) resulting from their cooperative efforts within a unified
scheme of institutions.
Rawls’s case is an instance of a priority problem: how should competing claims
and their respective principles be prioritized? In A Theory of Justice, Rawls discusses
the priority problem in relation to intuitionism, faulting the intuitionist with provi-
ding no systematic assignment of weights for adjudicating competing claims and
principles.71 Instead, intuitionism relies on intuitive trade-offs between conflicting
claims. Critical contextualism attempts to avoid intuitive trade-offs by rationally
grounding the justification of principles in distinct contexts of deployment. However,
the formal strategy fails in this regard, for there are at least some cases when a
contextualist approach will fail to provide such grounds. Take, for example, a global
analog to the relationship between the difference principle and the just savings
principle, namely, how the distributive claims among co-nationals are balanced, or
prioritized, against the claims of foreigners affected by the cooperative efforts among
co-nationals. Here the conflict is between a pure procedural and transitive context.
To avoid intuitionist trade-offs, critical contextualism must offer a reasoned response
to this priority problem, and, to do that, it must resituate the conflict within a
broader context. But what might be that broader context? Further abstraction could
fail to capture the manner in which claims to resources originate, thereby severing
the link between normative directives and their contexts of application. So, while a
more abstract context, such as ‘resource allocation,’ includes both pure procedural
and transitive contexts, it is too abstract to expose a systematic link between
principles and contexts, and thus too abstract to solve the priority problem in a
manner consistent with critical contextualism.
While my inability to provide a contextual answer does not entail the absence of
any such answer, it seems almost certain that at some point contextualism will
face a priority problem that falls between contexts. Contexts are not always
autonomous. They are often conceptually linked. Yet if this is the case, then the
formal strategy runs up against a limit, and, in order to circumvent the limit,
contextual arguments must rely on another approach (intuitionism, constructivism,
and utilitarianism) to determine the priority between conflicting principles.
Interestingly, David Miller’s approach to the priority problem includes a non-
contextual set of priority rules (he calls them sub-duties), which he derives from our
duty to respect human rights. Miller identifies four priority rules when conside-
ring conflicts between global and domestic duties.72 The first rule*refraining from
infringing on basic human rights*entails that each person’s basic human rights
are to be given equal consideration irrespective of nationality. For example, ‘the
government of a nation whose members are starving would not be justified in
seizing resources from another nation if this meant that some of that nation’s
members would fall below the threshold for adequate nutrition.’73 Not unlike Rawls,
Miller thinks cooperative activities among one group are constrained by a criterion
identifying illegitimate externalities. In this case, the priority rule coordinates pure
procedural and transitive contexts, giving priority to the latter. This is an intuitively
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plausible answer, but it is not a contextual answer. Miller does not justify basic
human rights by reference to an interdependent relationship between facts and
principles.74 Rather, he advances a humanitarian strategy along the lines of the first
strategy considered and dismissed at the outset of this paper*the stand-alone
justification of context. He grounds basic human rights on ‘facts’ about what humans
‘need.’75 This creates a number of philosophical challenges, but it also suggests a
departure from contextualism in at least this case. Interestingly, Miller does not
‘claim that there are no context-independent principles of justice . . . [and] it may
be that contextualism alone can provide no decisive argument for prioritizing one
context and its associated principles.’76 But if this is so, where does it leave
contextualism and its unique perspective concerning the relation between facts
and principles? Why not suppose, as some philosophers suggest, that context-
independent principles are logically prior to, and ground the justification of, context-
dependent principles?77
CONCLUSION
Such questions take us well beyond the scope of this paper, which already raises
tough questions for critical contextualism. Nevertheless, recalling a point made
earlier, I think critical contextualism offers meaningful insights into normative
political theory. I will close this paper by briefly underscoring the insights that,
I think, move normative political theory in a productive direction.
The first is that critical contextualism tries to identify a role for factual
considerations in the defense of principles. It does this by taking a piecemeal
approach to theory, one that treats diverse political issues in terms of their unique
contextual features rather than systematically as part of*and answered in terms
of*an overarching theory of justice. I think this piecemeal approach to normative
theory is promising because it is connected to a methodological approach that
covers all normative issues. On this point, Miller again converges with Rawls, who
took an increasingly piecemeal approach in his later writings, noting:
Each time [the subject changes] the constructivist procedure is modified to fit the
subject in question. In due course all the main principles are on hand, including
those needed for the various political duties and obligations of individuals and
associations. Thus, a constructivist liberal doctrine is universal in its reach once it is
extended to give principles for all politically relevant subjects.78
Critical contextualism, like Rawlsian constructivism, is methodologically universal
in its reach. It specifies a systematic approach for addressing diverse normative
issues. It does not identify a set of universal principles in terms of which diverse
subjects can be assessed. Instead, each subject is taken up separately and assessed
in terms of its contextual features.
This methodological approach helps explain the persistence of moral pluralism
without invoking mysterious intuitions or surrendering to blind relativism. This
is the second important feature of contextualism, namely, that the structure of
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justification explains the existence of rival principles in terms of ordinary factual
circumstances that can be rationally analyzed. Different contextual circumstances
require different principles of justice. Analyses of the context can help determine
which principle is appropriate to which context. In the case of the formal strategy,
although the analyses cannot resolve all conflicts*such as conflicts between
substantive principles sharing the same form or conflicts between contexts*they
nevertheless might resolve many conflicts. Moreover, for those conflicts left
unresolved, the formal strategy at least provides a reason for why certain disputes
cannot be resolved to fewer than several plausible rivals.
In virtue of rationally explaining pluralism, contextualism provides an account of
what a correct normative judgment looks like. Correct normative judgments reflect
a relational property, rather than a non-natural or supervenient property.79 This is
the third important feature. With respect to the formal strategy, the relational
property obtains between a normative directive and the manner in which claims to
resources originate. The relation admits of an underlying logic whereby the
appropriate principle is the one that answers the claim. In order to answer the
claim, the structure of the principle must reflect the structure of the association
within which the claim to resources originates. When these structures match,
normative judgments based on the appropriation principle are correct; they reflect
the right form.
The logical relation between claims and principles has no practical import without
either the actual facts that give rise to claims or the particular principles that help
address them. The fourth and final important feature of contextualism is that real
world facts help shape and shift our moral horizon. Following Rawls, I referred to
this as the limits of the practicably possible, and understood these limits as providing
both a ceiling beyond which our moral ideas represent sheer fancy and a floor below
which factual considerations represent mere expedience. Some facts are morally
relevant, and the challenge is to discern which facts. I think a plausible response to
this challenge takes a piecemeal approach to normative theory, where issues are
framed in terms of their (formal) contextual features. This returns us to the first
insight noted previously.
Unfortunately, none of the strategies canvassed in this paper fully realize all four
features. As a result, these insights seem to go unfulfilled. In light of this, those who
find Miller’s general view of contextualism appealing might develop its features by
contextualizing an already existing approach rather than further developing critical
contextualism. In my view, the leading candidate is Rawlsian constructivism. I noted
earlier in this paper that, in response to a variety of reasons for thinking objective
characterizations of contexts impossible, one might specify interpretations of
contexts in terms of political problems in need of rectification. Certain elements
of Rawlsian constructivism can be developed along these lines.80 As the other
two strategies for addressing these arguments*reflected in Miller’s manner of
proceeding*seem to fail, a contextualized constructivism could very well be the best
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